Beyond NJ 9842 Read online

  Operation Meghdoot was launched by the Indian Army on the barren and icy heights of the Siachen glacier in April 1984 to thwart Pakistan from gaining control of this strategically located glacier. For three decades since then, Indian and Pakistani troops have been locked in an undeclared war on the world’s highest – and coldest – battlefield.

  This is the untold story of blood, guts and glory displayed by the brave Indian soldiers and air warriors on Siachen.

  When not reporting news for India’s leading broadcaster NDTV, Nitin A. Gokhale loves to write – either for his blog (NewsWarrior) or for various strategic affairs journals. And travel to conflict zones. Author of three books before this one, media trainer and visiting faculty at India’s top defence institutions, he has been a multimedia journalist since 1983.

  Soldier of Siachen We Salute you !

  There are Soldiers and Soldiers,

  But You are a Soldier and More

  You Braved the Dangers of Soldiering and Others Too.

  The Danger of Burial in a Crevasse or by an Avalanche

  Or of Being Crippled by the Pain that Comes

  With the Ice Gales of Karakoram, Saltoro and Ladakh Ranges

  Be Proud that You Inhaled the Pure Himalayan Air

  Because it is the Same Air that in the Plains

  Fertilises the Thoughts of Patriots

  Be Content that You Lived

  On Glacial Heights in the Service of the Nation

  For the Supreme Mountain Goddess Inspired and Guided You

  Towards the Glory of Your Fate

  —Anonymous

  BEYOND NJ 9842

  The SIACHEN Saga

  BEYOND NJ 9842

  The SIACHEN Saga

  Nitin A. Gokhale

  The Siachen glacier service ribbon

  © Nitin A. Gokhale, 2014

  First Published, 2014

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  BLOOMSBURY PUBLISHING INDIA PVT. LTD.

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  ISBN: 978-93-84052-05-8

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  To

  The Indian soldier

  Who gives so much and

  Asks for nothing but dignity and a

  little understanding from his countrymen

  Acknowledgements

  This book would not have been possible without these friends, seniors and organisations who shared their inputs without reservations.

  •Indian Army

  •Indian Air Force

  •Lt. Gen (Retd) ML Chibber

  •Brig (Retd) VN Channa

  •Col (Retd) Narinder ‘Bull’ Kumar

  •AVM (Retd) Manmohan Bahadur

  •Lt Gen Sanjay Kulkarni

  •Lt Gen KH Singh

  •Maj Gen Shokin Chauhan

  •Lt Gen (Retd) PC Katoch

  •Brig Abhijit Bapat

  •Air Com (Retd) Anil K. Sinha

  •Group Capt (Retd) WV Rama Rao

  •‘Capt’ Joesph ‘Sam’ Samuel

  •Col (Retd) Gopal Karunakaran

  •Col (Retd) Danvir Singh

  •Army Medical Corps

  •Ketki Angre

  •Mayank Singh

  •JAK LI Regimental Centre

  Foreword

  At the strategic level, one requires a long memory and a longer foresight and vision.

  Boundaries are a manifestation of national identity. Disputed boundaries are often trip-wires of war. Siachen sits astride two disputed boundaries: with Pakistan and China. Nitin Gokhale’s book ‘Beyond NJ 9842: The Siachen Saga’ has motivated me to write about its strategic significance for India and the complexities that come in the way of resolving this dispute.

  Siachen lies in the Karakoram Range (beyond the Ladakh Range) in the Northwest of India. The Glacier descends from a height of 23,000 to 12,000 feet. It is 75 km long and covers about 10,000 sq km uninhabited terrain. Along with other glaciers in this area, it is an important source of water for the Indus River which passes through Ladakh and Kargil, and then into Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK). The area is claimed by us on the basis of accession of J & K to India in October 1947 and the Karachi Agreement of 1949, which described the ceasefire line beyond NJ 9842 (Saltoro Ridge and beyond) to be ‘running Northwards to the glaciers’.

  Pakistan’s cartographic attempt to join NJ 9842 to Karakoram Pass on the India-China boundary (a straight line moving Northeast instead of North) sending mountaineering expeditions and preparations to occupy it with military was foiled when India launched ‘Operation Meghdoot’ in April 1984. Indian army occupied the Soltoro Ridge to secure the glacier and the territory to its east. This deployment (a) dominates Pakistani positions in the valley west of Soltoro Ridge (b) blocks infiltration possibilities across the Soltoro Ridge passes into Ladakh (c) prevents Pakistani military adventurism in Turtuk and areas to its south. Its Northernmost position at Indira Col overlooks the Shaqsgam Valley (illegally ceded by Pakistan to China) and denies Pakistani access to the Karakoram Pass. Since then the line dividing the military forces of India and Pakistan in the area north of Point NJ 9842 has come to be known as the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL).

  Siachen has always been considered a military setback by the Pakistan Army. That the Indians dominate the area from the Saltoro Ridge and Pakistan troops are nowhere near Siachen Glacier is a fact never mentioned in public. The perceived humiliation manifests itself in many ways. When the Indian Army pre-empted Pakistan plans and occupied the Saltoro Ridge, Benazir Bhutto publicly taunted the Pakistani Army as ‘fit only to fight its own citizens’. She did that again when in 1987, Indian troops led by Naib Subedar Bana Singh captured the 21,000-feet Quaid-e-Azam Post in the area and renamed it Bana Post.

  In Pakistan, Siachen is a subject that hurts, just like a thorn in its flesh. It is a psychological drain on the Pakistani Army. Pervez Musharraf had once commanded the Special Services Group (SSG) in this area and made several futile attempts to capture Indian posts. One of the motivating factors, and one of the military objectives of the Pakistan Army during the Kargil war in 1999 was to ‘recapture’ part of the Siachen Glacier and cut off our vital communication links to this area. They failed and suffered heavy casualties.

  And now to the Chinese involvement and the Sino-Pakistan strategic nexus!

  Two years after occupying Tibet in 1950, China started construction of a strategic road connecting Tibet to Xinjiang (China National Highway 219) through Aksai Chin, considered a part of J & K state. The road completed by 1957, heralded Chinese occupation of Aksai Chin whose boundary with Tibet had several disputed records and versions. The disputed boundary and claims on the area became one of the triggers for the Sino-Indian war of 1962. Soon after the war, Pakistan and China signed the Sino-Pakistan Border
Agreement in 1963 in which Pakistan unilaterally ceded Shaqsgam Valley (J & K territory under occupation of Pakistan, flanking the Saltoro Ridge) to China. This agreement described the eastern termination of the Sino-Pakistan boundary at Karakoram Pass. On the maps, Pakistan drew the line from NJ 9842 towards the North East to Karakoram Pass, ignoring “thence north to the glaciers” statement of the 1949 Karachi Agreement. The result: Karakoram Pass, till then on the boundary between India and China, now had Pakistani involvement.

  It should be noted that the Chinese were willing to negotiate and settle the boundary issue of J&K (west of Karakoram Pass) with Pakistan. But till date, they have refused to discuss that boundary with India on the ground of it being ‘disputed’.

  In 1987, China and Pakistan signed the protocol to formalise the demarcation of their boundary. Termination of this boundary at Karakoram Pass and Pakistani recognition of Chinese sovereignty over Aksai Chin clearly indicated an understanding between them.

  In 1997, when I was Chief of the Army Staff, China agreed to send its military commander opposite Ladakh to meet his India counterpart in Leh as a confidence-building measure. Near the date, it proposed that the meeting be held in New Delhi instead of Leh. As that would have served no purpose, the meeting was called off. After the Kargil war, military attachés from all countries except Pakistan were invited for a conducted tour of the battle zone. The Chinese attaché declined that invitation.

  Four years ago, China started issuing “stapled visas” to visitors from J&K, thus bringing into question its status as part of India. It refused a visa to the GOC-in-C, Northern Command, who was to make an official visit to China as part of ongoing military-level exchanges.

  China has now increased its civil and military presence in the northern areas, purportedly to improve infrastructure there. Among the infrastructure reconstruction projects to be given priority are those related to the repair and upgradation of the Karakoram Highway, which was damaged in 2009. China also plans to construct railway tracks and oil pipelines from Kashgar in Xinjiang to Gwadar port in Pakistan.

  Why has military withdrawal from Siachen become more complicated now?

  Whenever India and Pakistan have discussed the Siachen glacier issue, Pakistan has refused to authenticate the AGPL and the existing troops’ locations. Pakistan demands Indian troops’ withdrawal to the pre-1972 position i.e. to the east of the line joining NJ 9842 and Karakoram Pass. The strategic consequences of a deal without formal authentication are obvious. Pakistan army will have comparatively easier access to the Saltoro Ridge and to the glacier. That will also ensure security of the Shaksgam Valley for China and put a final stamp on its political control.

  In the initial stages, occupation of the Siachen glacier area undoubtedly led to some financial drain on Indian resources, apart from a military effort of Herculean proportions. However, over the years, with experience and improved technology, these difficulties have been overcome substantially.

  The lack of trust between India and Pakistan (particularly with the latter’s army) is well known. Without formal authentication of the AGPL, how does one detect any future encroachment into this area? It must be stated categorically that no amount of existing technology can have fool-proof surveillance and capability to detect small-scale infiltration, which is sufficient to hold and defend a tactical feature in this terrain. Can India afford to forego the strategic significance of the Soltoro position due to the financial cost-benefit ratio analyses or because not a blade of grass grows in the area? Then why put up the Indian flag at Gangotri in South Pole? Can India trust Pakistan to the extent of foregoing formal authentication of the AGPL after what its army did across the formally delineated LoC in Kargil? Our negotiators must keep all these points in mind in their discussions with Pakistani counterparts.

  So far, only a few people have written a detailed story on Siachen, which became the highest battlefield in the world, and is now the highest conflict zone. Nitin Gokhale, son of an ex-soldier, and now author, teacher and an accomplished journalist, gives an extensively anecdotal account and deep insight in ‘Beyond NJ 9842: The Siachen Saga’. His interviews with soldiers who participated in the initial launch of Operation Meghdoot and their first hand accounts add an extremely useful human touch to the story. The large number of high quality, rare and unseen photographs of the glacier operations bring the story alive and help appreciate the harsh terrain and the human endeavours involved to overcome its physical and biological impact.

  Nitin Gokhale’s thirty years’ experience, hunger for news and diligence in research makes this book extremely interesting and informative.

  March 2014

  General V P Malik

  Former Chief of Army Staff

  251, Sector 6, Panchkula 134 109

  Contents

  Acknowledgements

  Foreword

  Introduction

  OPERATION MEGHDOOT – THE EARLY DAYS

  I. Waking Up To Siachen

  II. Weighing the Options

  III. Getting Ready

  IV. Race to Bilafond La

  V. Staying Put

  VI. The Conflict Widens

  MASTERING THE MOUNTAINS

  VII. The Air Warriors

  VIII. Getting the Logistics Right

  IX. The Intrepid Indian Soldier

  X. The Tale of Three Battles

  XI. Medicine Men: Siachen Saviours

  XII. A Civilian Perspective

  XIII. Why India Cannot Give Up Siachen

  Commanders: Siachen Brigade

  Glossary

  Introduction

  ‘Mountains and the military fascinate me in equal measure’

  Maybe because between 1983 and 2006, living in and reporting from India’s North-east, I dealt with them more frequently than with anything else.

  And then there was the summer of 1999.

  Paying a silent tribute to the Siachen warrior

  At the Siachen War Memorial with my wife, Neha

  That year, a combination of serendipity and a risk-taking editor of Outlook magazine took me to the mountains of Kargil. That is when I first heard of Siachen, but only in passing.

  During that 45-day assignment, reporting the mini war between India and Pakistan, I did occasionally hear a comment, ‘Pakistan’s ultimate aim was to isolate and cut off Siachen,’ but as a reporter concerned only with getting the next story right, one never gave enough thought at that time to the ‘strategic’ aspect of the Kargil conflict.

  Shifting to Delhi in 2006 and taking up larger responsibilities in NDTV, was an opportunity to widen horizons.

  Within the first couple of months, the Siachen question popped up again in the context of searching for a lasting peace between India and Pakistan. Diplomats looking for a quick solution to the half-a-century old problem between India and Pakistan, identified Siachen and Sir Creek as ‘low hanging fruits’ to be plucked, to initiate a larger peace process.

  When negotiations failed to make much headway, a convenient scapegoat was sought to be found in the then Army Chief, who had insisted that the respective deployments of the Indian and Pakistani troops be marked on a map before arriving at any ‘solution’ to Siachen, a position not acceptable to Pakistan. The ‘peaceniks’ accused the Indian military of exercising a veto on foreign policy; the military said it was only giving professional opinion.

  The renewed focus on Siachen revived my passing interest in the area. As I started reading available material, and simultaneously talking to people who had served there, the glacier beckoned. In July 2007, grabbing the first opportunity to visit Siachen, I spent four days at the Base Camp, talking to soldiers and pilots, and observing their routine, the adjustments that they made physically and in their minds; the preparations that went into the three-month deployment at altitudes where humans are not supposed to stay for prolonged periods.

  For the next six years, I kept going back to Ladakh, once for a fairly longish family holiday and at least half a dozen times
on work, reporting the trouble on the Chinese border, a natural calamity and celebrating a decade of victory in Kargil. Through all this, Siachen remained a half mystery: I knew the official Indian position, the extent of deployment of the Indian Army in the area, and the stupendous jobs that the air warriors were doing in sustaining the deployment at those forbidding heights. Personal stories were however missing. Which officers and men outsmarted the Pakistanis in occupying the key watershed of Saltoro to secure Siachen in the summer of 1984? Was it a political or a military decision? Or a combination of both? Who discovered Pakistan’s cartographic aggression in the Karakorams?

  At the Siachen Battle School in October 2013

  They would have remained questions in my mind, but for a chance meeting with Suresh Gopal of Bloomsbury India at a function to launch a book written by former Central Army Commander, Lt. Gen VK Ahluwalia. Over dinner a week later, we got talking. When Suresh asked me what book would I be interested in writing, my instinctive answer was, “a comprehensive book on India’s North-east.” And I proceeded to tell him about my long association and affinity with the region. Sure, he said, but how about something on the Indian military?

  And at that moment, without thinking, I said “What about a book on Siachen?”

  I do not know why I said it. I was aware of at least four books on Siachen that been written previously; I had not done adequate research on the subject, and I was not even sure of getting access to the Siachen area. So, how was I to write a book? But, Bloomsbury was eager. And I thought the time was right. April 2014 I knew, would mark 30 years of Operation Meghdoot, the Indian military’s longest continuous deployment. So in a way, a deadline was already set. If I had to write any book on Siachen, its release had to be timed with the 30th anniversary. That left me with less than six months to assemble the material and write the manuscript.